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I.

JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT

This Court has jurisdiction over this matter in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §
78A-3-102(4), and pursuant to the Order entered by the Utah Supreme Court dated
November 17, 2009, transferring this matter to this Court.
II.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

Issue: Defendants/Appellees Professional Title Services and Clay Holbrook assert
that the principal issue presented for review is whether the trial court properly granted
summary judgment in favor of Defendants.
Standard for review: Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the
appellate court "grant[s] no deference to the court below, but instead, 'the district court's
legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment are reviewed for
correctness.'" Barnes v. Clarkson, 2008 UT App 44, \ 8, 178 P.3d 930 (quoting Massey
v. Griffiths, 2007 UT 10,1 8, 152 P.3d 312). Additionally, in reviewing a grant of
summary judgment, the appellate court "view[s] the facts and all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Arnold Indus, v.
Love, 2002 UT 133, ^ 11, 63 P.3d 721 (quotingDCMInv. Corp. v. PinecrestInv. Co.,
2001UT91,P6,34P.3d785).
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III.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiff Tonda Hampton (hereafter referred to as "Plaintiff or "Ms. Hampton")
filed her original complaint against Defendants on August 14, 2007 (R. 1). She
eventually filed her Third Amended Complaint on November 5, 2008 (R. 131), bringing
claims against Defendants for declaratory judgment, (R. 138), breach of contract (R.
140), breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing (R. 141), slander of title (R. 142),
negligence (R. 143), and fraud (R. 144). The factual allegations in Plaintiffs Third
Amended Complaint pertain to transactions involving parcels of real property in Carbon
County, Utah: one parcel of approximately 4,000 acres (R. 134), and one parcel of
approximately 6.32 acres with a residence (R. 134). Essentially, Plaintiff alleges that she
owned those parcels together with Kim Jensen (whom she refers to as K.C. Jensen or her
"Joint Tenant"), but that her name was "fraudulently" removed from the title to the
properties. (R. 133-138). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Professional Title Services
and Clay Holbrook assisted Kim Jensen with the transactions wherein Plaintiff lost her
interest in the properties. (R. 133-138).
In the Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she entered into an oral
agreement with Clay Holbrook wherein she would "relinquish her rights" in the 6.32
acres parcel of property by selling that property to Defendants for $21,185.47. (R. 136 at
^f 31). Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Clay Holbrook refused to finalize the transaction,
and thereby breached their oral agreement. (R. 136-138, 140-142).
Plaintiff was given ample time and opportunity to conduct discovery. The first
scheduling order was entered on June 13, 2008, providing that fact discovery should be
4

completed by October 31,2008 (R. 76-77). After Plaintiff filed a motion to amend the
scheduling order, a second scheduling order was entered on August 11, 2008, providing
that fact discovery would end on December 2, 2008. (R. 84-86, 92-93). A third
scheduling order was entered on March 9, 2009, providing that fact discovery should be
completed by July 10, 2009. (R. 157-158). During the course of discovery, Plaintiff
served various discovery requests, to which Defendants responded and provided at least
668 pages of documents pertaining to the underlying transactions. (R. 81-83, 97, 149,
172, 174, 233). Plaintiff had ample time and opportunity to conduct discovery, she
served several discovery requests, and in response to such discovery requests she
received hundreds of pages of documentation pertaining to the real property transactions
she put at issue in her Third Amended Complaint.
After the close of fact discovery (pursuant to the deadline in the third amended
scheduling order), Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment. (R. 235; see
also Addendum 1 at p. 29). Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion for
summary judgment, and an affidavit supporting her memorandum. (R. 377-503; see also
Addendum 7 and 8 at pp. 105-130). She attached several documents to her affidavit,
most of which had been produced by Defendants. (R. 401-503). However, neither her
memorandum in opposition nor her affidavit made any attempt to controvert the
statement of undisputed facts as set forth in Defendants' memorandum. (R. 377-400). A
hearing on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was held on September 21, 2009.
(R. 547; see also Addendum 9 at pp. 131-168). During the hearing, Judge Thomas heard
oral argument from both parties, and asked Plaintiff several questions regarding her
5

claims and contentions. (R. 547 at pages 13-28; see also Addendum 9 at pp. 135-150)1.
As a result of the briefs and the hearing, the trial court granted Defendants' motion. The
Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was entered on October 8, 2009,
granting summary judgment to Defendants on all of Plaintiff s claims. (R. 533-541; see
also Addendum "A" to the Brief of Appellant). Plaintiff then filed this appeal.
IV.
1.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Plaintiff Tonda Hampton (hereafter referred to as "Plaintiff or "Hampton")

filed a lawsuit against Kim Jensen in the Seventh District Court on November 10, 1999,
case number 994700340 (referred to hereafter as the "1999 Suit."). (R. 240, 258-276).
2.

In conjunction with the 1999 Suit, Plaintiff recorded several lis pendens

against parcels of real property, as follows:
a. Recorded on November 15, 1999, in the Carbon County Recorder's Office,
as Entry No. 77489, against approximately 4,078.61 acres of real property
(R. 240, 280-282; see Addendum 2(a) at p. 41);
b. Recorded on February 4, 2000, in the Carbon County Recorder's Office, as
Entry No. 78686, against two parcels of property, together with all rights of
access, grazing rights, and water rights (R. 241, 283-284; see Addendum
2(b) at p. 44);
c. Recorded on March 31, 2000, in the Carbon County Recorder's Office, as
Entry No. 79477, against two parcels of property, together with all rights of
1

Only the first page of the transcript of the hearing on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was marked as
part of the record, number 547. Therefore, references to the transcript of the summary judgment hearing will refer
to the number marked as the record, 547, followed by individual pages as identified in the transcript.

access, grazing rights, and water rights (R. 241,285-286; see Addendum
2(c) at p. 46);
d. Recorded on March 31, 2000, in the Carbon County Recorder's Office, as
Entry No. 79478, against approximately 4,078.61 acres of real property (R.
241, 287-289; see Addendum 2(d) at p. 48).
3.

Two of the lis pendens specifically state, "The Petitioner [Ms. Hampton]

claims marital interest or a partnership interest in the above-described lands, this being
the object of the action." (R. 241, 286, 289; see Addendum 2 at pp. 47, 50).
4.

On January 23, 2002, the Seventh Judicial District Court, Judge Scott N.

Johansen, entered a stipulated order in the 1999 Suit requiring Ms. Hampton to release
her lis pendens as to two specific parcels so those parcels could be sold to third parties
(R. 290-312; see Addendum 3): (1) the Ghost Town Guest Ranch Lodge, consisting of
approximately 6.37 acres) (hereafter referred to as "House Parcel"); (2) a total of 675
acres west of Helper, Utah (hereafter referred to as "Vacant Parcel."). (R. 241, 290-293;
see Addendum 3 at pp. 58-61).
5.

The Stipulated Order of the 1999 Suit provided that the lis pendens was to

remain in effect with respect to the remainder of the property. (R. 242, 294).
6.

The Stipulated Order also ordered that the two parcels be sold, and after the

payment of certain expenses, the proceeds from the sale should be "deposited into an
interest bearing trust account, set up by counsel for [Tonda Hampton and Kim Jensen],
with both signatures required for disbursements, which funds are to be distributed as the
Court orders and as the parties might agree." (R. 242, 294 at Tf 8).
7

7.

Defendant Professional Title Services was retained as the closing and

escrow agent for the sales of the two parcels. (R. 242, 313-317).
8.

At the time Professional Title Services became involved, the Home Parcel

was under contract to sell to Leo Foy and Clayton Foy for $200,000.00. (R. 242, 314 at

114-7).
9.

The Vacant Parcel was also under contract to sell to Leo Foy and Clayton

Foy, for a price of $135,000.00. (R. 242, 314 atfflf4-7).
10.

Defendants had no involvement in the negotiation of the two contracts, but

was only involved to act as closing and escrow agent for the transaction. (R. 242, 314 at

17).
11.

The two transactions took approximately two months from when

Professional Title Services was retained until the transactions closed in January, 2002.
During that time period, Defendant Clay Holbrook ("Holbrook"), the President of
Professional Title Services, was in communication with Richard Golden, the attorney for
Kim Jensen, and Douglas Stowell, the attorney for Tonda Hampton. (R. 242, 314 at ^f 9).
12.

Before the transactions closed, Holbrook was informed by both Richard

Golden and Douglas Stowell that the parties had agreed to escrow the proceeds from the
sales, and that the parties' agreement would be entered as an order of the Court. (R. 243,
315 at If 10).
13.

The transactions both closed on January 25, 2002. (R. 243, 315 at If 10,

318-321).

8

14.

The settlement statement from the sale of the House Parcel shows that the

proceeds from the sale, after deducting payments for loans and other costs, were
$42,060.94. (R. 243, 315 at If 12, 318).
15.

The settlement statement for the Vacant Parcel shows that the proceeds

from the sale, after deducting payments for loans and other costs, were $40,466.15. (R.
243,315at^|13,320).
16.

After the transactions closed and the funds were received by Professional

Title Services, Holbrook caused the proceeds to be distributed as required by the Court.
(R. 243, 315 at T| 14).
17.

The proceeds from the sale of the Vacant Parcel, in the amount of

$40,466.15, were distributed by way of a check from Professional Title Services to
Richard R. Golden and Douglas Stowell, the attorneys for Kim Jensen and Tonda
Hampton, dated January 29, 2002. (R. 243, 315 at ^ 15, 322).
18.

The proceeds from the sale of the House Parcel, in the amount of

$42,060.94, were distributed by way of a check from Professional Title Services to
Richard R. Golden and Douglas Stowell, the attorneys for Kim Jensen and Tonda
Hampton, dated January 29, 2002. (R. 243, 315-316 at ^ 16, 323).
19.

Professional Title Services was only retained to act as closing and escrow

agent, and once the checks were issued to the two attorneys, neither Professional Title
Services nor Clay Holbrook had further involvement. Neither Professional Title Services
nor Clay Holbrook has any knowledge of what happened to the proceeds once the
attorneys received them, or how the proceeds were distributed. (R. 244, 316 at ^f 17).
9

20.

On December 13, 2002, Plaintiff filed another lawsuit against Kim Jensen

and Double J. Triangle, LLC, in the Seventh Judicial District Court, case number
020701072 ("2002 Suit"). (R. 244, 325-328, 363-364; see Addendum 5 at p. 90).
21.

In conjunction with the 2002 Suit, Plaintiff recorded a lis pendens against

many of the same parcels at issue in the 1999 Suit and identified on the lis pendens
recorded in the 1999 Suit ("2002 Lis Pendens"). (R. 244, 280-289, 329-331; see
Addendum 2 at page 51).
22.

The 2002 Lis Pendens is signed by Plaintiff, and states, "During this case, a

Lis Pendens need [sic] to be in place. To protect the Real Estate involved. Respondent
[Kim Jensen] has been depleting, hiding, transferring, out of Petitioners [sic] name,
Fraudulently." (R. 244, 331; see Addendum 2 at p. 53).
23.

On January 6, 2003, Plaintiff filed another lawsuit against Kim Jensen in

the Seventh Judicial District Court, case number 030700004 ("2003 Suit"). (R. 244, 332336, 366-367; see Addendum 5 at p. 93).
24.

In conjunction with the 2003 suit, Plaintiff filed a lis pendens against many

of the same properties identified in the lis pendens of the 1999 Suit ("2003 Lis Pendens").
(R. 245, 337-339; see Addendum 2 at p. 54).
25.

On April 23, 2004, Plaintiff filed another lawsuit against Kim Jensen in the

Seventh Judicial District Court, as case number 040700256 ("2004 Suit"). (R. 245, 340342; see Addendum 4 at p. 65).
26.

In the 2004 Suit, Plaintiff named Kim Jensen and Richard Golden, a former

attorney of Kim Jensen, as defendants. (R. 245, 340).
10

27.

In the 2004 Suit, Plaintiff alleged that an "Interest Bearing Trust Account"

was established, referring to the Stipulated Order entered in the 1999 Suit on January 23,
2002. (R. 245, 340). Plaintiff also alleged that the "trust account no longer exists." (R.
245, 340).
28.

Also in the 2004 Suit, Plaintiff alleged that Kim Jensen "has now sold all of

our other Carbon County Real estate," and "Defendants [sic] True Records will show that
Petitioner [Tonda Hampton] has never given any oral or written document to allow any
ownership change on approx. 4,000 acre[s, w]hich are at issue." (R. 245, 341; see
Addendum 4 at p. 67).
29.

In response to Plaintiffs complaint filed in the 2004 Suit, Kim Jensen filed

a motion to dismiss, and a memorandum in support. (R. 245, 343-372; see Addendum 5).
30.

The motion to dismiss and memorandum in support filed by Kim Jensen in

the 2004 Suit asserted the defense of res judicata and set forth the history of Plaintiff s
various lawsuits filed against Kim Jensen. (R. 245, 345-347). The memorandum
contains as exhibits various court pleadings that have since been destroyed by the
Seventh Judicial District Court (R. 245-246):
a. Exhibit I to the memorandum is the Order, Findings, and Conclusions for
the 1999 Case, holding that Tonda Hampton and Kim Jensen did not have a
common law marriage, dismissing the 1999 Suit with prejudice, and
ordering the lis pendens filed by Tonda Hampton against all real property to
be released (R. 246, 352-361; see Addendum 5 at pp. 80-89);
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b. Exhibit II is the complaint in the 2002 Suit, containing allegations that the
real property should be divided (R. 246, 362-364; see Addendum 5 at pp.
90-92);
c. Exhibit III is the complaint in the 2003 Suit, alleging that Kim Jensen had
"sold and hidden" real property, and asking the Court to "reverse
ownership" of the real property and other assets (R. 246, 365-367; see
Addendum 5 at pp. 93-95);
d. Exhibit IV is a ruling in the 2002 Suit and the 2003 Suit (which cases were
apparently consolidated), dismissing the claims pertaining to the real
property, and ordering the lis pendens filed by Plaintiff to be released. (R.
246, 368-372; see Addendum 5 at pp. 96-99).
31.

In response to the motion to dismiss filed by Kim Jensen in the 2004 Suit,

the Seventh Judicial District Court granted the motion and entered an order on September
13, 2006, dismissing the 2004 Suit on the ground that the 2004 Suit was barred due to the
doctrine of res judicata ("2004 Order"). (R. 246, 373-376; see Addendum 6).
32.

Plaintiff filed this action against these Defendants on August 14, 2007. (R.

1, 246). Plaintiff filed her Third Amended Complaint on November 5, 2008, bringing
allegations regarding the real property that was litigated in the 1999 Suit, the 2002 Suit,
the 2003 Suit, and the 2004 Suit. (R. 131-148, 246-247) Plaintiffs requested relief asks
for, "[a] declaratory judgment concerning real property titled in plaintiffs name and to
the, Water Rights, Hunting rights and BLM leases to be shown as Discovery unfolds; [b]
injunction for Defendants to correct all mistakes concerning all real estate interests, water
12

rights, hunting rights and not limited to BLM Leases. Plaintiff is willing to be
compensated at fair Market value as of approximately 2007 or 2008 all Plaintiffs interest
have been depleted from her ownership to be shown as discovery unfolds." (Id.)
33.

In approximately July of 2007, Plaintiff contacted Clay Holbrook with

questions regarding the sales of the two parcels and the distribution of the proceeds. (R.
247,316).
34.

In an effort to avoid litigation, Holbrook made a settlement offer to Plaintiff

to resolve all claims and prepared a proposed settlement agreement. (R. 247, 316, 658).
35.

Ms. Hampton did not agree to the proposed settlement agreement as

prepared by Mr. Holbrook, but instead stated that she would only accept the amount
offered by Mr. Holbrook as payment for the House Parcel, and that she intended to
pursue the remaining claims pertaining to the Vacant Parcel. (R. 247, 316).
36.

In her Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that she entered into an

agreement with Defendants whereby Defendants would purchase her interest in the
House Parcel. (R. 136 at ^ 31).
37.

During the summary judgment hearing, Plaintiff stated that the intent of the

alleged oral agreement was for Defendants to purchase her interest in the House Parcel:
THE COURT:
Okay. What were the terms, do you believe?
MS. HAMPTON: The terms were to—I would relinquish my
rights, basically, it was all stated on a document he typed up, everything
was legit on August 27th, so all those terms in that August 27th disclaimer, I
believe would be correct, to my belief, and it's all listed in the disclaimer.
Those are the terms where I would relinquish my rights to the error of title
of 6.31 acres for the value of—consideration of 21,185.47.
(R. 547 at page 22; see Addendum 9 at p. 144).
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THE COURT: —there is a reasonable basis to find there is a
disputed fact regarding the existence of an oral contract. And—and I'm
looking to see what you believed the terms of the oral contract were and
where that—where that document is—why you believe those terms are
accurate, the basis for what you believe those terms are.
MS. HAMPTON: The basis, he agreed to pay the money to
relinquish my rights of my titled ownership that the company erred in. I
don't believe I have the—a document to show that at this time.
THE COURT: Okay. So, there's no document that shows what the
terms of that agreement were; is that correct?
MS. HAMPTON: Not at this time—
(R. 547 at page 23; see Addendum 9 at p. 145).
THE COURT: Yeah. In other words, the terms of a contract would
be, you know, the—the things that go to the heart of the agreement. In other
words, there would be a payment, you allege, of twenty-one thousand
some-odd dollars in exchange for what? What—what-what were the terms
of the—of the oral agreement from your perspective?
MS. HAMPTON: He would pay me the $21,185.47 to relinquish my
rights to a deed of 6.32 acres. That was a discussion and an agreement we
came to.
THE COURT: So, it was-it was totally to relinquish rights to a
deed? That's all it was?
MS. HAMPTON: To relinquish my rights to a deed, one deed of
6.32 acres.
THE COURT: Okay. So, essentially, your oral agreement was the
payment would be made to relinquish the rights in land. Is that what you'reMS. HAMPTON: Yes.
THE COURT: -is that what you're telling me?
MS. HAMPTON: It was land, real property.
THE COURT: So, ma'am, is it your assertion that it was not in the
nature of a settlement agreement?
MS. HAMPTON: No.
THE COURT: It was not in the nature of a settlement agreement?
MS. HAMPTON: No. TheTHE COURT: But rather was for payment for an interest in land. Is
that what you're asserting? I want to make sure I understand this, ma'am.
MS. HAMPTON: Correct.
(R. 547 at pages 24-25; see Addendum 9 at pp. 146-147).
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V.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Although Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment raised several legal
theories, there is only one issue relevant to this appeal: whether the trial court properly
granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Defendants assert that the trial court
properly granted the motion.
First, the undisputed facts as presented by Defendants were not controverted by
Plaintiff. The affidavit and documents presented by Plaintiff in her memorandum in
opposition did not have any information sufficient to raise issues of fact. In her appellate
brief, Plaintiff makes various arguments that the trial court did not allow her to present
evidence. However, this matter was decided on summary judgment so Plaintiff had every
opportunity to present evidence in her briefings and at the hearing on Defendants'
motion. Plaintiff conducted significant discovery, but the documents and information
presented in her opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment failed to create
issues of fact. Accordingly, the facts presented by Defendants were undisputed by
Plaintiff.
Second, the trial court was correct in ruling that Plaintiffs claims are barred by the
doctrine of res judicata. The undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff has filed several
lawsuits pertaining to her ownership interest in the real properties at issue in this matter.
Plaintiff brought the 1999 Suit, the 2002 Suit, the 2003 Suit, and the 2004 Suit against
Kim Jensen alleging that Plaintiff owned interests in real property, and that Kim Jensen
had "fraudulently" removed Plaintiffs name from the title to the properties. In those
lawsuits, Plaintiff filed lis pendens against the same real property that is at issue in this
15

matter. The undisputed facts demonstrate that all of those cases were resolved against
Plaintiff, with the trial courts ordering Plaintiff to release the lis pendens, and ruling that
Plaintiff had no interest in those properties. Plaintiff brought this matter naming
Defendants as parties rather than Kim Jensen, but her allegations are the same as the
other lawsuits. Therefore, Plaintiffs claims are barred by res judicata.
Third, the trial court was correct in ruling that Plaintiffs claims are barred by the
statute of limitations. The undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff did not file her
complaint against Defendants until August 14, 2007. However, Plaintiff was aware of
the facts and circumstances pertaining to her allegations beginning as early as the 1999
Suit. Defendants acted as closing agent for the transaction that took place in January,
2002. After the transaction closed, Defendants wrote a check to the attorneys for Plaintiff
and Kim Jensen for the amount of the final proceeds resulting from the transaction. After
that point, Defendants had no further involvement. Plaintiff then brought lawsuits in
2002, 2003, and 2004, raising the same allegations that have been brought in this matter.
Therefore, it is apparent that Plaintiff had knowledge of the facts and circumstances
underlying her allegations, and the statute of limitations on her claims ran well before
August, 2007, when she filed her action against Defendants. Accordingly, Plaintiffs
claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations.
Fourth, Plaintiffs claims of an oral agreement are barred by the statute of frauds.
In her Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserted that the alleged oral agreement was
intended to "relinquish [her] rights" in the House Parcel. At the hearing on Defendants'
motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff clarified that the oral agreement was for
16

Defendants to purchase her interest in the House Parcel, yet she also admitted that there
was no written agreement, and she presented no signed, written agreement together with
her opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, because
Plaintiff has asserted an oral agreement for the purchase of an interest in real property,
her claims based upon the alleged oral agreement are barred by the statute of frauds.
VI.

ARGUMENT - THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY
GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
DEFENDANTS

The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, as
Plaintiff did not dispute Defendants' statements of fact, and the undisputed facts
demonstrate that Defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The facts of
the case and the law are clear that Plaintiffs' claims are barred due to res judicata, the
statute of limitations, and the statute of frauds.
A.

Plaintiff failed to dispute Defendants' statement of
facts

Summary judgment is proper if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P. "When the moving party has
presented evidence sufficient to support a judgment in its favor, and the opposing party
fails to submit contrary evidence, a trial court is justified in concluding that no genuine
issue of fact is present or would be at trial." Smith v. Four Comers Mental Health
Center, Inc., 2003 UT 23, f 40, 70 P.3d 904 (quoting Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler,
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768 P.2d 950, 957 (Utah Ct.App.1989)). Finally, "An affidavit that merely reflects the
affiant's unsubstantiated opinions and conclusions is insufficient to create an issue of
fact." Id. at H 50 (quoting Dairy Prod Servs. v. City ofWellsville, 2000 UT 81 at ^ 54, 13
P.3d581).
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure require that in opposing a motion for summary
judgment, "[f]or each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, the opposing party
shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute, supported by citation to
relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials." Rule 7(c)(3)(B) U.R.C.P..
Plaintiffs memorandum in opposition to Defendants' motion for summary judgment
failed to controvert any of Defendants' statements of fact. (R. 377-400; see Addendum 7
and 8 at pp. 105-130). In opposing Defendants' motion, Plaintiff did not respond to any
of Defendants' facts, but instead, she only discussed unsubstantiated allegations.
Although Plaintiff identifies documents that supposedly support her allegations, there is
no indication in any of the documents provided by Plaintiff that she disputed any facts
raised by Defendants. The issues presented by Defendants pertained to res judicata and
the statutes of limitations. The facts (or allegations) raised by Plaintiff were not relevant
to the issues raised by Defendants, and would have no bearing on the decision by the
Court. Therefore, Defendants' statement of facts were undisputed by Plaintiff.
In the Brief of Appellant, Plaintiff summarily asserts that "the evidence does not
support the court's ruling that [of] res judicata," and the "court improperly prevented
Plaintiffs evidence of fraud issues." See Brief of Appellant at page 12, items LA. and
I.D. In another part of her brief, Plaintiff states, "Had the court simply allowed Plaintiff
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to introduce her evidence to this case [sic] would have clearly been in Plaintiffs [sic]
favor and exposed Defendants' misleading intent." See Brief of Appellant at page 10.
However, Plaintiff makes those statements without providing any supporting arguments
or citations to the record. She does not indicate what evidence she was prevented from
introducing, or even what evidence supports her allegations of fraud.
The proceeding below was a motion for summary judgment. The record
demonstrates that Plaintiff conducted significant discovery and Defendants produced
hundreds of pages of documents in response to Plaintiffs discovery. Defendants brought
a motion for summary judgment, and Plaintiff had every opportunity to present her
evidence in her briefings in opposition to Defendants' motion and at the hearing.
Plaintiff failed to dispute Defendants' statement of facts as presented in their motion for
summary judgment, so it was appropriate for the trial court to make a ruling as a matter
of law as to the issues presented by Defendants.
B.

The trial court properly granted summary
judgment as to the issue of res judicata

Res judicata encompasses two distinct doctrines: claim preclusion and issue
preclusion. Pride Stables v. Homestead Golf Club, Inc., 2003 UT App 411, \ 14, 82 P.3d
198. "[C]laim preclusion bars a party from prosecuting in a subsequent action a claim
that has been fully litigated previously," and involves three elements:
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, the
claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit
or be one that could and should have been raised in the first action. Third,
the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
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Id. at 115 (quoting Snyder v. Murray C/(y Cor/7., 2003 UT 13, 1j 34, 73 P.3d 325).
Defendants recognize that they were not parties to the previous suits filed by Tonda
Hampton, so claim preclusion would not be applicable. However, the doctrine of issue
preclusion does bar Plaintiffs claims.
Issue preclusion "arises from a different cause of action and prevents parties or
their privies from relitigating facts and issues in the second suit that were fully litigated in
the first suit." Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT 13, % 35, 73 P.3d 325 (quoting
Maoris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, ^f 19, 16 P.3d 1214). Issue
preclusion requires four elements:
(i) [T]he party against whom issue preclusion is asserted must have been a
party to or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; (ii) the issue
decided in the prior adjudication must be identical to the one presented in
the instant action; (iii) the issue in the first action must have been
completely, fully, and fairly litigated; and (iv) the first suit must have
resulted in a final judgment on the merits.
Id. (quoting Collins v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment, 2002 UT 77, lj 12, 52 P.3d 1267).
Plaintiff filed four separate and distinct lawsuits for the purpose of adjudicating title to
the properties at question in this suit: the 1999 Suit {see supra Section IV. Statement of
the Facts (hereafter "Facts" or "Fact") 1-5, 30(a)), the 2002 Suit {see Facts 20-22, 30(b,
d); see Addendum 5 at p. 90), the 2003 Suit {see Facts 23-24, 30(c-d); see Addendum 5 at
p. 93), and the 2004 Suit {see Facts 25-31; see Addendum 5 at p. 65). Therefore, the first
element is met, as Plaintiff was the same party in the prior suits.
In each of the aforementioned suits, Plaintiff brought claims asserting her interest
in the real properties at issue in this case. See id. Specifically, Plaintiff filed lis pendens
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in the 1999 Suit, the 2002 Suit, and the 2003 Suit. See id.; see also Addendum 2. The
issues in this case are identical to the issues in the prior cases: Plaintiff is asserting that
she has a right in or title to various parcels of real property. Although in the prior cases
she was asserting the claim against a different party, it is evident that she lost those cases,
and so is trying to find a new party against whom to bring her grievances. However, the
issues are identical, so the second element of issue preclusion is met.
The previous suits were completely, fairly, and fully litigated. The dockets and
the pleadings of the prior cases demonstrate that Plaintiff was represented by various
attorneys, filed several motions, and had every opportunity to present her case to the
Court. See generally Facts 1-6, 20-31.
Finally, the previous suits resulted in final judgments on the merits. The first was
the Stipulated Order from the 1999 Suit entered on January 23, 2002. See Fact 4; see
Addendum 3. In the Stipulated Order, the parties agreed, and the Court ordered, that the
properties would be sold and the proceeds would be put in escrow. See Facts 4-6.
Defendant Professional Title Services was retained to conduct the closing, and on
January 29, 2002, Defendant transmitted the proceeds to the attorneys for Kim Jensen
and Tonda Hampton. See Facts 7-19. Accordingly, Defendants complied with their
obligations, and the proceeds were distributed directly to Plaintiffs counsel. Plaintiffs
remaining claims to the other parcels of property were dismissed by a final order of the
Court, wherein the Court found that Plaintiff and Kim Jensen did not have a common law
marriage, and therefore ordered the lis pendens filed in the 1999 Suit to be released. See
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Fact No. 30(a); see Addendum 5 at pp. 80-89. Therefore, Plaintiffs claims in the 1999
Suit were fully adjudicated.
The claims in the other suits were also fully adjudicated. The 2002 Suit and the
2003 Suit ended with a final order of the Court dismissing Plaintiffs property claims and
ordering the lis pendens to be released. See Fact 30(d); see Addendum 5 at p. 96. The
2004 Suit also resulted in a final order on the merits, once again dismissing Plaintiffs
claims wherein she asserted an interest in the property through a partnership agreement.
See Fact 31; see Addendum 6 at p. 100. Accordingly, the fourth element of issue
preclusion is met, as Plaintiffs claims in the prior suits all resulted in final judgments on
the merits.
Plaintiff has already attempted, multiple times, to claim an interest in the real
properties that are the subject of this suit. Each time, a judgment was entered against
Plaintiff, or Plaintiffs claims were dismissed on the merits. Plaintiffs suits against Kim
Jensen have failed, and she has sued these Defendants to attempt to find a party to pay
her for property that the Seventh District Court has already declared never belonged to
her. Accordingly, Plaintiffs claims have already been fully litigated in previous suits,
and the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the
ground that Plaintiffs claims are barred due to the doctrine of res judicata.
C.

The trial court properly granted summary
judgment as to the issue of the statute of limitations

Plaintiffs Third Amended Complaint brings causes of action for declaratory
judgment, breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, slander
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of title, negligence, and fraud. The statute of limitations for fraud claims is three years
from the discovery of the fraud. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-305(3). The statute of
limitation is four years for all other claims raised by Plaintiff. See Utah Code Ann. §
78B-2-307 ("An action may be brought within four years . . . for relief not otherwise
provided for by law.").
The undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff filed suit against Kim Jensen on
November 10, 1999, and recorded a lis pendens against the parcels of real property at
issue in this matter as early as November 15, 1999. See Facts 1-3. The properties at
issue were sold on January 25, 2002 (with Defendants acting as the closing agent for that
transaction), and Defendants distributed the proceeds of the sale to counsel for Plaintiff
on January 29, 2002. See Facts 6-18. Accordingly, Plaintiff or her counsel were
involved in litigation asserting an interest in title to the parcels of real property, and when
they were sold, the proceeds were distributed to Plaintiffs attorney on January 29, 2002.
Therefore, any cause of action regarding title to the real properties, and Defendants'
involvement in the sale of those properties, began to run at the latest on January 29, 2002.
Because the statute of limitations on all actions other than fraud is 4 years, (and the
statute of limitations for fraud is only 3 years), the statute of limitations on Plaintiffs
claims expired in January, 2006. Plaintiff did not file her initial complaint in this matter
until August, 2007. See Fact 32. Accordingly, Plaintiff filed her complaint after the
statute of limitations had run, and Plaintiffs claims are barred.
In the Brief of Appellant, Plaintiff has argued that the "fraudulent concealment"
doctrine prevented the running and expiration of the statutes of limitations. See Brief of
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Appellant at 11-13. As a general rule, a statute of limitations begins to run "upon the
happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of action." Colosimo v.
Roman Catholic Bishop, 2007 UT 25, f 14, 156 P.3d 806 (quoting Russell PackardDev.,
Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, ^ 20, 108 P.3d 741). An exception to that general rule is the
discovery rule, which operates to toll a statute of limitation "until the discovery of facts
forming the basis for the cause of action." Id. at ^ 15 (quoting Carson, 2005 UT 14, ^f 21,
108 P.3d 741). The discovery rule only applies if "provided for by statute (the 'statutory
discovery rule')" or "when required by equity (the 'equitable discovery rule')." Id. The
equitable discovery rule may be applied "when either exceptional circumstances or the
defendant's fraudulent concealment prevents the plaintiff from timely filing suit." Id.
In the Colosimo case, the Supreme Court clarified the knowledge requirement in
the context of the discovery rule:
A plaintiff is deemed to have discovered his action when he has
actual knowledge of the fraud "or by reasonable diligence and inquiry
should know, the relevant facts of the fraud perpetrated against him." We
have particularly emphasized the importance of the diligence requirement,
stating that "[a] party who has opportunity of knowing the facts constituting
the alleged fraud cannot be inactive and afterwards allege a want of
knowledge" and that "[a] party is required to make inquiry if his findings
would prompt further investigation." In other words, if a party has
knowledge of some underlying facts, then that party must reasonably
investigate potential causes of action because the limitations period will
run.
Id. at If 17 (quoting Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 1188, 1196 (Utah 1993)). In this case, it
is not necessary to discuss whether the statutory discovery rule or the equitable discovery
rule apply, because the allegations and pleadings filed by Plaintiff in conjunction with the
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2002 Suit, the 2003 Suit, and the 2004 Suit clearly demonstrate that Plaintiff had
knowledge of the facts underlying the alleged fraud when she filed those suits.
In conjunction with the 2002 Suit, Plaintiff executed and caused to be recorded a
lis pendens on December 19, 2002. See Fact 21 (R. 329-331; see Addendum 2 at p. 51).
On the 2002 lis pendens, Plaintiff states, "During this case, a Lis Pendens need [sic] to be
in place. To protect the Real Estate involved. Respondent [Kim Jensen] has been
depleting, hiding, transferring, out of Petitioners [sic] name, Fraudulently." Fact 22 (R.
331; see Addendum 2 at p. 53). Therefore, as early as December 19, 2002, Plaintiff
asserted that properties were being fraudulently transferred out of her name. Those are
the same allegations, and pertain to the same parcels of property, that are at issue in this
matter. The facts also demonstrate that Plaintiff raised those same issues in the 2003 Suit
and the 2004 Suit. See Facts 23-31.
The undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff had knowledge of the facts
underlying the alleged fraud as early as December 19, 2002, and the statute of limitations
on all claims began to run at that time by at least that time (if not before), expiring well
before August, 2007, when Plaintiff brought her complaint against Defendants.
Therefore, because Plaintiff did not file her complaint against Defendants until August,
2007, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Defendants on the issue of
the statute of limitations.
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D.

The trial court properly granted summary
judgment as to the issue of the alleged oral
agreement

In her Third Amended Complaint, and at the hearing on Defendants' motion for
summary judgment, Plaintiff asserted that the terms of the alleged oral agreement
provided that Defendants would pay a sum of money to Plaintiff, in exchange for which
Plaintiff would convey her interest in the House Parcel to Defendants. See Facts 33-37.
An oral agreement for an interest in land is barred by the statute of frauds.
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 provides as follows:
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not
exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property
or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned,
surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by
deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting,
assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent
thereunto authorized by writing.
Plaintiffs alleged oral agreement clearly falls within the statute of frauds.
Plaintiff asserted that Defendants agreed to purchase her interest in the House Parcel. An
agreement of that nature is clearly an agreement for the purchase of an "interest in real
property." Accordingly, because there is no writing, the agreement is barred pursuant to
the statute of frauds, and the trial court properly granted Defendants' motion for summary
judgment on the issue of Plaintiff s oral agreement.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Defendants assert that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor
of Defendants for the following reasons:
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(A)

Plaintiff failed to dispute Defendants' statement of facts; the documents and

arguments presented by Plaintiff in her opposition did not create a material issue of fact,
pertaining to res judicata, the statute of limitations, or the statute of frauds; because the
proceeding before the trial court was a motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff had every
opportunity to present evidence in opposition to Defendants' motion, therefore her
arguments that the trial judge "prevented testimony" is not correct;
(B)

Plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata; Plaintiff

brought several suits (in 1999, 2002, 2003, and 2004), asserting that she had wrongfully
lost her interests in real property, and all those cases were decided on the merits against
Plaintiff, so her claims are barred pursuant to res judicata;
(C)

Plaintiffs claims are barred by the statutes of limitations; the previous suits

filed by Plaintiff demonstrate that she had knowledge of the facts underlying her
allegations in this action as early as December, 2002, so the statute of limitations ran by
at least December, 2006, long before Plaintiffs complaint was filed in August, 2007;
(D)

Plaintiffs allegation of an oral agreement is barred by the statute of frauds;

Plaintiff asserted that Defendants had agreed to purchase her interest in the House Parcel,
and such a verbal agreement for the purchase of an interest in land is clearly barred by the
statute of frauds.
For all the foregoing reasons, Defendants request that this Court affirm the trial
court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants.
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